A critique of political reason (part 2): Practical political reason
One question that should trouble most reading this is why is there such a disjunct or severe bifurcation between Kant’s unique and remarkable critiques and the miasma of his political philosophy. Perhaps, surprising as it seems, it is due to his primarily bourgeois sensibilities; certainly his political ideas are reactionary in the extreme. Yet, this is the same Immanuel Kant who produced the tremendous critiques which showcase that jewel in the crown of the trilogy -- the Critique of Practical Reason (CP).
The second critique, CP, is in essence the central work which both the first and third critiques are anchored on. If it was not for the issue of morality, it can be arguably said that Kant would not have produced the critiques as we know them for a crucial purpose of his project was to show that we can indeed have meaningful notions of the good and act that out, without being accused of metaphysical speculation or rendered impotent through scepticism. And importantly, we do not need the dogmatism of religious zealots to inform us of what is the right thing to do; our practical reason takes care of that and it is a driving force in defining us as humans.
This second part looks at how practical reason shapes Kant’s moral constructivism and is the basis of his political constructivism which runs counter to his political theory. In other words, Kant’s political reason is that which is morally driven.
The moral basis of things
Just as Kant was adamant on providing certainty in knowledge in CR through his transcendental philosophy, he was determined to provide reliable grounds for doing the right thing in the form of the categorical imperative, for instance. But it is not the categorical imperative as much as the moral force itself that helps create one’s reality which is at the heart of CP; it is also what underwrites the egalitarian and empowering principles of Kant's philosophical project. These ideas salvage Kant’s reputation from the harshness of his political thinking to provide, through extrapolation, what can be called his political reason.
Early on in the CP Kant says,
In practical philosophy, which has to do only with the grounds of determination of the will, the principles which a man makes for himself are not laws by which he is inexorably bound, because reason, in practice, has to do with a subject and especially with his faculty of desire…The practical rule is always a product of reason, because it prescribes action as a means to an effect which is its purpose...It is a rule characterized by an “ought” which expresses the objective necessitation of the act and indicates that, if reason completely determined the will, the action would without exception take place according to the rule. (CP 20)
What Kant is saying is that the will is influenced by practical reason and that is the same as free will reflective of human freedom. Man is not bound by a law by which he now must follow no matter what, but has the choice to do what is right from his own reason and if he does so it will be for the highest good of all as a duty. The moral choice comes from within and is not imposed from without: This is crucial in Kant.
Kant tries to clarify this a little later -- “But for reason to give law it is required that reason need presuppose only itself, because the rule is objectively and universally valid only when it holds without any contingent subjective conditions which differentiate one rational being from another.” (CP 21) Here Kant implies that there is no personal point of view or subjectivist perspective in producing a moral imperative for oneself. For a moral imperative is validated through practical reason which exists in each person, and that in turn is based on a moral grounding of each individual from which those imperatives and practical reason emanate; and in this way the imperatives can be regarded as universal: So we can expect that others can have similar moral imperatives and that they can understand where our own comes from. This is not an imposition of an external law or an internal one, but an imperative based on our free will which we make into a duty for ourselves without any desire for external rewards or recognition.
We further learn from Kant,
It would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws, which must have an objective and not just subjective necessity and which must be known a priori by reason instead of by experience, no matter how empirically universal. Even the rules of uniform phenomena are denominated natural laws (for example, mechanical laws) only if we really can understand them a priori…Only in the case of subjective practical principles is it expressly made a condition that not objective but subjective conditions of choice must underlie them, and hence that they must be represented always as mere maxims and never as practical laws. (CP 27)
Kant hearkens to the first critique on how laws are generated based on synthetic a priori conceptions and why this does not apply to moral imperatives. The ideas of the former are constitutive and regulative, whereas the latter are directive/directing in how to act. The moral imperative is not a law in that it has a way of getting agreement on its validity because it has empirical backing or can be accepted as a theoretical construct. Its force comes from its subjective-universal applicability which does not qualify it as some universal law, but rather as a maxim which one uses that can be accepted by others on a subjective-universal ground that applies to everyone. When that is used as the basis for a shared moral imperative then its force is guaranteed in a way by it not having a determinate end like the happiness of the individual or mankind. Rather the moral imperative is to ensure that we are worthy of happiness: This is what gives it objectivity from the subjective-universal ground of the will. This is central to a lot that follows and is one of Kant’s great insights.
We then reach one of the central ideas in Kant, on the links between freedom, the will and morality (Kant’s italics in all quotes):
The question now is whether our knowledge of the unconditionally practical takes its inception from freedom or from the practical law. It cannot start from freedom, for this we can neither know immediately, since our first concept of it is negative, nor infer from experience, since experience reveals only the law of appearances and consequently the mechanism of nature, the direct opposite of freedom. It is therefore the moral law, of which we become immediately conscious as soon as we construct maxims for the will, which first presents itself to us; and, since reason exhibits it as a ground of determination which is completely independent of and not to be outweighed by any sensuous condition, it is the moral law which leads directly to the concept of freedom. (CP 30).
To Kant our knowledge of freedom comes from the practical law or moral law. We cannot understand this from the world of appearances but from the exercise of our will and freedom to choose against what the sensuous or natural world’s restrictions pose on us. For instance, the physical restrictions of the world and dangers it can bring, together with a sense of limitation that one has to struggle to survive, goes against the grain of the moral law which can make us choose -- as an act of will – freedom; or that which opposes self-interestedness (and sometimes, even survival).
Kant develops this idea further by saying that the (moral) will is pure will as there is no precedence for it in the realm of the phenomenal world as understood by natural law. It is one of a kind and can be understood as grounded on morality itself. The moral law seems to operate like a natural law but does not have the same result in that it is not a reflection of phenomena happening in the world and rationalizing causes for it. Yet, the moral law operates on the basis of generating a system of law like the natural one but is actually in the form of a maxim that a person can follow.
So Kant says,Therefore, it is at least not impossible to conceive of a law that alone serves the purpose of the subjective form of principles and yet is a ground of determination by virtue of the objective form of a law in general. The consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason, since one cannot ferret it out from antecedent data of reason, such as the consciousness of freedom…and since it forces itself upon us as a synthetic proposition a priori based on no pure or empirical intuition. It would be analytic if the freedom of the will were presupposed, but for this, as a positive concept, an intellectual intuition would be needed, and here we cannot assume it…
Pure reason alone is practical of itself, and it gives (to man) a universal law, which we call the moral law. (CP 31)
Kant is looking for a certain ground from which to launch the moral law and he finds it in pure reason. From this we can have certainty and communicate it to others and aim to create moral solutions to situations because we have not only the common practical grounds of reason itself, but we can project this in the form of a universal law in general (the awareness of which when generated in this manner is a fact of reason). But moral laws are not universal laws like natural ones; though they have universality due to their form which is similar to natural ones. Kant is interested in finding how we can provide certainty to moral ideas and have a basis for commonality in expressing them by showing the subjective-objective content-form they have; this also allows for universality and acceptability among peoples.
Furthermore, the idea of heteronomy (relying on something external to us) is opposed to autonomy (relying on something within us), and the latter is a distinctive feature in the expression of free will. This is an important idea that will provide the basis for further examining and recuperating from the damaging impact of Kant’s political ideas. Our man further says,
The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them; heteronomy of choice…not only does not establish any obligation but is opposed to the principle of obligation and to the morality of the will.
The sole principle of morality consists in independence from all material of the law…and in the accompanying determination of choice by the mere form of giving universal law which a maxim must be capable of having. That independence…is freedom in the negative sense, while this intrinsic legislation of pure and thus practical reason is freedom in the positive sense. Therefore, the moral law expresses nothing else than the autonomy of pure practical reason, i.e., freedom. This autonomy of freedom is itself the formal condition of all maxims, under which alone they can all agree with the supreme practical law. (CP 33-34)
Free will and the ability to choose is the idea behind moral laws and the duties it brings and it is centred within us; this makes us autonomous beings. Relying on something external to guide us and give us meaning and direction is to lose autonomy and provides a way out of moral responsibility and the obligation it brings.
The object of the moral law is the desire to do something, but we must not be a slave to that or be obsessed with an end goal to determine what is the right thing to do as it must be done as a universal principle as opposed to an end goal everyone is legislated to follow. The format of a law for our maxims shows us that it is universal and independent, but the positive aspect of our freedom comes from the obligation we give ourselves to do what is right irrespective of the impact on our comfort zones. This is what makes us free individuals, that is, the ability to break free from what constrains us.
Then the lines that dive deeper into Kant’s idea on the connection between the supersensuous noumenon and the phenonmenal world:
The sensuous nature of rational beings in general is their existence under empirically conditioned laws, and therefore…heteronomy. The supersensuous nature of the same beings…is their existence according to laws which are independent of all empirical conditions and which therefore belong to the autonomy of pure reason. And since the laws…are practical laws, supersensuous nature…is nothing else than nature under the autonomy of the pure practical reason. The law of this autonomy is the moral law, and it, therefore, is the fundamental law of supersensuous nature and of a pure world of the understanding, whose counterpart must exist in the world of sense without interfering with the laws of the latter… (CP 43)
Kant merges the idea of the laws of phenomena that come from reason which explain the conditional world we live in as experienced empirically with that of the seemingly unconditional world of the noumenon, as grasped and given intelligibility by practical reason. Only the latter can give an understanding of the noumenal world which natural laws cannot; and the natural world can be understood better via the underlying moral laws of practical reason which are an expression of our autonomy. The world of seeming dependence on empirical changes is underpinned by the unchanging world of freedom and morality which are direct aspects of the noumenon. Therefore, Kant’s vision of the world and the universe is a moral one.
This central idea in Kant’s thinking is further developed:
For, in fact, the moral law ideally transfers us into a nature in which reason would bring forth the highest good were it accompanied by sufficient physical capacities; and it determines our will to confer on the sensuous world the form of a system of rational beings. The least attention to ourself shows that this Idea really stands as a model for the determination of our will. (CP 43)
It seems that Kant is saying that we can shape the world we live in, and therefore create our destiny, via expressing our freedom as moral beings for the highest good of all and this could be supported by the physical world under the right conditions. This reality which can be manifested as a moral expression of ourselves is a noumenal expression translating itself into phenomenal expression. This implies that with force of the moral law we can co-create the world we live in. It is not that we end up changing the so-called law of gravity as such, but that we change the world in a way that positively reflects our stewardship of life and the environment of the planet, through creating and sustaining the appropriate socio-economic structures.
Kant goes on to develop another of the central themes of his philosophy which forms the basis for his moral constructivism: It is not the idea of good and evil that is the datum for the moral law but the latter that provides the source for such notions. And he goes on to expand on this,
This remark, which refers only to the method of the deepest moral investigations, is important. It explains once and for all the reasons which occasion all the confusions of philosophers concerning the supreme principle of morals…Whether they placed this object of pleasure, which was to deliver the supreme concept of good, in happiness, or in perfection, in moral feeling, or in the will of God – their fundamental principle was always heteronomy, and they came inevitably to empirical conditions for a moral law. (CP 64)
Kant points out that to place the source of the highest good and the joy it may bring in a source external to oneself inevitably results in surrendering our freedom to an external law, condition or force. Heteronomy involves empirical evidence and natural law explanations to ascertain the good it generates for a person. This would be a subreption. The moral law is not only a priori and has no basis in the natural world nor metaphysical speculation, but it comes from within and thereby signals our autonomy and guarantees the certitude of the moral drive.
The idea of co-creation of reality is expanded by Kant when he says that morality as expressed via the practical law is geared towards the highest good of all, and so what we work towards in that construction of a society for everyone’s good is such that it does so for the welfare of all. This does not, however, preclude taking challenging decisions that could place us in jeopardy when, for instance, speaking truth to power. Whatever the consequence to ourselves, we will do what is right for the welfare/highest good of others; for the end goal is not the happiness of others so much as doing what makes us worthy of happiness and in that respect, we would add to the happiness of ourselves and others. (CP 69-70, 93)The moral law is the ground from which the highest good commences. It may seem circular but there is hardly a way out for Kant on this score in that the drive and source of the highest good is itself, so it is directing in nature but not directed towards a specific goal as that would be the way the natural laws would work which are empirically/verification oriented and thereby heteronomous. (CP 109-110)
These central Kantian ideas take fuller form when expanded into how the practical will avoids the dual dilemma of empiricism and mysticism; this is also what Kant was avoiding when he wrote the CR. When the motivation and goal of our actions are our comfort and happiness instead of doing what is right, then we are guilty of seeking validation for our acts in the form of empiricism; this would fit utilitarian doctrines and is heteronomous. This would also entail seeking a reward in doing something to gain satisfaction rather than an inner motivation that would reflect one’s conscience.
Similarly, to do something based on ‘God’s will’ is not only to make metaphysical assumptions according to Kant, but to dive into mysticism/the transcendent and thus rely on divine edict’s outside of oneself; this too is to indulge in heteronomy. Our agency, free will and autonomy is denied unless we rely on our moral judgement and our capacity for this based on our will and practical reason: This is the building block for our empowerment. We are “indeed legislative members of a moral realm which is possible through freedom and which is presented to us as an object of respect by practical reason.” (CP 82) Our will towards the highest good helps us co-create a moral realm as the expression of our freedom as autonomous beings.
Yet, Kant makes the point that it is empiricism that is more worrying than the mystical. It is looking for results that can be measured to secure one’s justification for doing something that is a greater distraction for our moral disposition. He says “that empiricism is far more dangerous than all mystical enthusiasm” (CP 71) as its apparent immediacy is always a compelling factor. We are normally trapped within the exigencies of physical issues that tend to cloud the need to rely on moral judgement. This is why Kant’s political ideas contradict what his moral thought gives us (which is the ground of his critical philosophy) -- that expediency and its empirical seduction cannot triumph over the moral will of one’s conscience which is our supreme human trait.
A core aspect of Kant’s practical reason would resonate with some revolutionary activists:
It follows of itself that, in the order of ends, man (and every rational being) is an end in himself, i.e., he is never to be used merely as a means for someone (even for God) without at the same time being himself an end, and that humanity in our person must itself be holy to us, and it is only on account of this and in agreement with this that anything can be called holy. (CP 131-132)
This is the kind of spiritual force that is usually found simmering at the heart of revolutionary thought where morality, purpose and action fuse into a whole without external incentive other than the drive for self realization for the highest good of all. True, sometimes this is mired in the goal of ridding a country of a dictatorship or oppressive regime, and that may seem heteronomous. But an unadulterated revolutionary motivation would see that no man is a commodity, and that each person is a free and autonomous being beyond measurement: For our essence is spiritual and thereby Immeasurable.
Bringing it together
A brief survey of the three critiques reveals that the first one looks at theoretical or speculative reason, what it is, and how we create knowledge. The CR looks at how we claim certainty in knowledge rather than explain what it is we exactly know. The CP looks at the free will, freedom, practical reason and their moral grounding. This in turn gives us autonomy and provides certainty in our moral claims and actions. The third critique (CJ), which is not looked at here, is about how we communicate in relation to nature, beauty, the sublime and art. It allows us to make claims about what is beautiful which though it may be subjective, still allows us to expect universal understanding from others on this. The CJ also examines issues related to the moral dimension which is the essence of Kant’s thinking.
The CR shows that we project what we know and that much of the world is understood by us a priori from the way human consciousness is ‘wired’ or ‘designed’. The CR sets the base for practical reason which goes on to show in CP, that we co-create moral realms through not only categorical imperatives but that the moral dimension is what makes the world intelligible to us: It fuses the noumenal basis of reason into understanding things in a holistic and coherent manner. So we project our moral creations and that shapes our world. This is Kant’s projection of empowerment and egalitarianism of each individual as they express themselves as free agents who can decide their destiny.
The fact of reason makes us aware of the intrinsic connection, or different side of the same coin aspect, of speculative reason and practical reason. And when we look at what is termed here Kant’s political reason we are looking at another dimension of Kant’s ideas that is, however, in contradistinction to his political thinking. Political reason expresses itself via synthetic a priori political theorizing that appropriately and effectively replaces and projects a viable set of political ideas for Kant.
Earlier it was mentioned that Kant’s subreption occurred when he made moral claims from his political ones, and the combined fetishized notions of them slipped into transcendentalism and transcendence: Because the moral drive has been hegemonised by the political one of expedience and Rightism/legalism. And republicanism, constitutionalism, and Rightism/legalism are treated as transcendent goals or Ideals to be realized and used to justify a reactionary status quo. We understand political reason to be underwritten by moral drives and practical reason (which also underpin pure reason and thereby theoretical/speculative reason).
Thus, political theories would be fused with moral drives as an expression of the moral ground. They are not hegemonised by morality but made intelligible solely by morality just as the workings and resultant products of reason itself are intelligible due to its practical essence.
Therefore, political reason gives proper and cogent expression to Kant’s political philosophy. It is also fused with practical reason -- which is what ultimately anchors his critiques and overall philosophical project. In other words, the accurate way to understand Kant’s political ideas is to apply them as moral constructs.
The material for Kant’s political theory would also be synthetic a priori in that there are notions of democracy, general will, social contract, equality, public good etc which are a priori constructs. These are then formulated into theories which would support ideas of republicanism (as various shades of democracy), authoritarianism, totalitarianism, socialism, anarchism, and all that would be termed radical political thinking. When we try to work this out empirically it is called politics and academically, political science. So another way to put it is that Kant’s political reason is the expression of a synthetic a priori projection of theoretical constructs aligned with the moral drive.
We could say that pure reason has the dimensions of practical reason (that underlies it), theoretical/speculative reason, and political reason. The latter can be expressed as theoretical constructs, and itself is an expression of practical reason and of the moral essence grounding it.
It can also be said that Kant’s republicanism, legalism, Right-ism and constitutionalism, as well as his fixation with a hierarchical system of government is a product of his theorizing which he attempts to verify with examples from his time and experience. These are manifestations of transcendental thinking which are used to explain and rationalize politics, traditional societal structures and forms of control. That Kant’s political ideas are reactionary in the extreme and even harsh in many aspects can only be speculatively said to be the result of his bourgeois attitudes and existence, and from biographical information that in his later years he conformed to authority; though this may have also been his way of showing that he was a good citizen of his land.
The problem starts when he takes his political theorizing to logical extremes, wherein the transcendental logic used to draw conclusions in a linear fashion finally produces puerile statements as seen where whatever good he attempts to rationalize through stability leads to despotism. Legal or constitutional despotism is still despotism; these are subtleties lost on the later Kant whose sharpness of mind is blunted by a form of worship of authority, and fetishized logicism.
It becomes problematic and painfully embarrassing when Kant facilely tries to combine his profound moral thinking with the effrontery of his politics. But we now can see the contradiction is severe for his entire moral philosophy is at odds with his political theory in that it is the former which is an expression of the spiritual in man, and the assertion of his freedom in contrast to being a driveling and sniveling slave to authority.
We need to extrapolate Kant’s ideas and see that the proper application of his practical reason to political reason can add to clarity in the form of the concept of practical political reason. Hence, we grasp the emphasis that the intelligibility granted to political reason comes from the moral dimension espoused as practical political reason (PPR). Through the term PPR it is easier to see that it is our moral grounding that determines our political thinking and thereby our political theories and actions. This means we have political theories that are projected from the morally grounded ideas of freedom, justice, egalitarianism, and wealth sharing and distribution for the highest good of all. So PPR would take us away from Kant’s reactionary bombast and towards uncharted territories in that it is an expression of our creative powers to meet challenges and forge the society we want.
Kant’s moral constructivism would include John Rawls’s notion of it, but it is developed here as people co-creating their own moral realm and society. As moral agents we create a moral realm, or world, made intelligible and free from the constraints that may be imposed by the phenomenal world; but also recognizing the pragmatic need to adapt to its physical constructs. Yet, the phenomenal world can also be influenced and shaped by the moral co-creation of human beings, as societal structures and phenomena can be changed to reflect moral consciousness.
Therefore, through each person via categorical imperatives and the exercise of their autonomy and free will grounded in morality we co-create a just and fair society that allows for the betterment of all and the highest realization of human potential. This is hardly utopia but what can be created when PPR is in force. It is just that we have not really given this a proper go yet.







