A critique of political reason (part 1): Transcendental politics
The posts here are based on an assumption that those reading it have reasonable familiarity with Kant’s ideas.
We will look at how Kant’s political ideas contradict the essence of his critical project as established by his critiques. It will be shown that his political theory is itself inadequate against the forceful ideas of the critiques that made him renowned (though their philosophical notoriety for some has not diminished). His political theory will be shown to be discredited by his moral philosophy which offers an alternate mode of political thinking and practice that is not only useful to radical political theorizing, but feasible for our times.
The three critiques of Kant are: The first critique, The Critique of Pure Reason (CR); the second critique, The Critique of Practical Reason (CP); and the third critique, The Critique of Judgement (CJ).
Before getting down to the heavy duty stuff, let me relate a joke from years ago. A man goes to a New Age dentist for treatment after strong recommendation by his friends as to the doctor's efficacy. As the dentist examines him he is told that he needs to have a tooth extracted. The dentist then puts on some soothing music, gets the aromatherapy scents going and begins to give the man techniques to calm his mind down. But the man asks with some concern whether he would perhaps need to be administered a local anesthetic, to which the dentist replies: “Here we practise transcendental medication…”
It is not easy trying to summarise the Kantian project but essentially Kant was intent on showing that philosophy could provide the way to asking the right questions and getting acceptable responses by avoiding the extremes of dogmatism and the problems it brings, as well as skepticism and what ensues from that. We can have cognition and knowledge of things that can be determined as objective and we can yet maintain belief in God, freedom and immortality. The way to examining our knowledge would be to see how the mind, from a philosophical perspective, processes sense data and cognizes what is presented to it, while avoiding being stuck in a certain kind of metaphysical speculation which would not be valid. Central to this is Kant’s distinction between analytic, synthetic and synthetic a priori ideas that set the stage for metaphysical discourse proper which would be the basis for creating scientific knowledge, or knowledge which we can claim to be certain.
But all this would be a lead up to the crux of his thinking that rests on his moral philosophy which helps seal his originality as a thinker. So what Kant is trying to do with the first critique (CR) is provide a means of showing that we can have certainty in our knowledge and build from it. But he draws some important distinctions that have bedeviled many till today; he says that the ideas of the world we draw in through the senses and cognize in our minds do not allow us to claim that we thereby have knowledge proper of the actual world as it is in itself. In other words, the so-called actual world can be thought of but we cannot say we know it in itself for in order to say we know the world as-it-is-in-itself (noumenon) we must suppose that which needs to be proven: That what we know is actually what the world is truly like in its essence/Reality. In fact, all we can be certain of in this context is the representation we have of the world and the ideas we generate from that. So our processing of data from the world and our understanding of it through our mental processes is but a representation of the actual world/noumenon. We can have knowledge but not of the world in itself nor directly know the noumenon.
This does not mean, for Kant, our ideas of the world only exist purely in the mind. The ideas are an objective representation of the world, but the important point he is making is that we cannot have ideas of the world in-itself per se without our mental processes creating the object/s in it by the discursive workings of our mind. So whatever we say we know about the world is shaped prior to our projected knowledge of it, for there is an automatic mental processing of sense data which pre-arranges perception etc. of the world we experience. The discursive workings of the mind, inevitably structure things in a way that can be understood through order and logic, and drawing conclusions from them; this is a distinct way in which our reason operates.
This discursive processing is always at work as it is the nature of the mind to do this, and since this processing happens prior to the world being presented to ourselves via the senses (intuition), it is said that the sense data of the world are processed automatically by us a priori. The processing and object-creating capability of our minds, operate through our mental schemata and categories which present the world and its objects the way we then claim to know them.
The objects and knowledge we gain after being a priori processed through our schemata are termed transcendental and we can now say we know these particular ideas as facts and can rely on them to build our web of knowledge. Analytical thinking clarifies this process of thought by assisting to define concepts related to transcendental objects. For those who want to make a serious study of Kant’s ideas and tackle the first critique head on, it will be useful to go through his Logic (i.e., the Jasche Logic) which helps clear the way through some of the thornier aspects of the CR. So while the analytic process pares away to make distinct concepts, the synthetic process adds to make distinct objects. But the two processes are synthesized in creating transcendental ideas. The building of ideas/knowledge based on synthetic a priori or transcendental ideas involve transcendental logic that allow for the kind of hypotheses formulated in science and axioms in mathematics.
So as Kant says (emphases are his): “I call all knowledge transcendental which deals not so much with objects as with our manner of knowing objects insofar as this manner is to be possible a priori. A system of such concepts would be called transcendental philosophy.” (CR B25)
What is radical (as in going to the root of the matter) about Kant’s ideas when closely examined and thought through is that he is making quite clear in the critiques that we are projecting the world from ourselves given the way we are ‘hardwired,’ so to speak. Together with the inputs from the world, we project and create our reality and we alone, and as a group of people, are responsible for the world we create. Therefore, the transcendental philosophy is a liberating set of ideas that prevents humans from blaming other forces such as divine interference in creating our problems. We have the moral drives, ability as expressed by our free will and so responsibility in interpreting and creating the world we live in.
The Kantian idea of human freedom is a crucial notion that will be developed as we go along. We may have some sense of the world based on our speculative/theoretical reason, which is our transcendental projection of it, but we can only give some form of meaning to it and to our lives when we understand it with the practical reason which comes from a moral base. So this makes it all the more strange when we look at Kant’s political ideas as to how he confuses and contradicts his transcendental political ideas and that of his moral ones governed by practical reason.
It must be stated, that when we say we know the reality about metaphysical concepts like God, freedom and immortality of the soul through our theoretical reason we are not making transcendental deductions but are now implying knowledge of such matters by basing them on assumed direct knowledge of the noumenon; we thereby make transcendent claims: These are invalid inferences for Kant. We cannot claim to know about transcendent ‘objects’ like God as the noumenon is not knowable to us directly other than claiming, in this instance, that we only have a transcendental idea of God (not direct knowledge of God). If we claim we know God, the soul and freedom in-themselves then we make transcendent claims and indulge in mysticism. God or freedom cannot be proven through speculative reason. There can be a transcendental idea of them that allows us to talk about what we think ‘freedom’ means, but some form of idea/ knowledge of them in-themselves can be arrived at only via practical reason. Both practical and theoretical reason are expressions of pure reason. But freedom is only known/understood as a direct expression of practical reason grounded on morality.
Kant’s basic political ideas revolve around a republicanism which he thinks allows for civil society and constitutions that provide the kind of restrictions to people who would otherwise be lawless and given to wildness. As people are not meant to live in abandon, they need limits to provide discipline and order to allow them to grow and prosper as human and social beings. What happens is that Kant then tries to fit this in a forced manner into his moral philosophy to show why his political ideas are good for people at all times. But it will be apparent that Kant shifts from making transcendental to arguably transcendent claims with his political ideas which do not fit and, instead, violate his moral philosophy.
Just as Kant claims that confusing transcendental claims with those of transcendence (the transcendent) in CR are a subreption (making invalid inferences), he does the same here in making invalid inferences between transcendental claims and moral ones and worse, he slips into trascendent claims in the process. His transcendentalism slides into transcendence and the subreption is complete when he bundles them as expressions of practical reason.
It must be clear though that subreption occurs because morality is hegemonised by Kant’s political ideas and his Rightism/legalism. But as will be explored, Kant’s philosophical redemption on this score happens when we examine the fusion of morality and political ideals not as the hegemonisation of the latter by the former, but by practical reason being the driving force of pure reason and, thereby, the defining factor of how speculative political theory should be formed when fully aligned to Kant’s philosophical project.
We begin with a look at what he says in “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective” (all italics in quotes throughout are Kant’s): “Thus a society in which freedom under external laws is connected to the highest possible degree with irresistible power, that is, a perfectly just civil constitution, must be the highest goal of nature for the human species…” (8:22) This implies that in order for there to be meaningful life for man, he must rely on that which is external to him but which he is a part of and something he helps create, that is, the State and what comes with it. Kant wants the State to have great power and use it to compel people to behave themselves.
Kant starts to really warm up on his ideas of Statism when we get to Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (PP) in which his vaunted republican constitution will guarantee peace everlasting because – the ( ) are Kant’s and the [ ] are the editor’s --
…the agreement of citizens is required to decide whether or not one ought to wage war, then nothing is more natural than that they would consider very carefully whether to enter into such a terrible game, since they would have to resolve to bring the hardships of war upon themselves (which would include: themselves fighting, paying the costs of the war from their own possessions, meagerly repairing the ravages that war leaves behind, and, finally, on top of all such malady, assuming a burden of debt that embitters the peace and will never be repaid [due to imminent, constantly impending wars]). By contrast, in the case of a constitution where the subject is not a citizen of the state, that is, in one which is not republican, declaring war is the easiest thing in the world, because the head of state is not a fellow citizen, but rather the owner of the state, and hence forfeits nothing of his feasts, hunts, summer residences, court festivals, and such things due to the war. The head of state can decide to wage war for insignificant reasons as a kind of game for amusement and can, for the sake of decency, indifferently leave its justification up to his diplomatic corps, which always stands ready for such tasks. (PP 8:351)
Reading this from our context we wonder if Kant is from another planet (he was broadminded enough to believe in extraterrestrial life); but to be fair he did not live through the twentieth century. Yet it is apparent that virtually all he says above about the good that comes from a so-called republican constitution has been violated to the letter and what is worse, when we have a system many tout as ‘democracy’, the egregious flaunting of what Kant purports should not happen in such an instance – with its civil constitution and even ‘separation of powers’ – is enacted as global criminality in its highest form.
Not only do we have war upon war in our time, but the debt burden is so great in, say, the US of A that most may never know what the phenomenal current debt actually is. The debt in this case is not just from war upon other states, but war upon its own people through vicious economic policies. And just extend Kant’s words to the national banquets, hunting trips, Camp David, Air Force One and countless perks that go to so-called elected characters like the Bushes, Clintons and even Obama, never mind the unelected characters of the world and their corps of diplomatic liars, and you begin to believe that the whole lot of them are from another planet.
What is happening is that Kant is confusing the transcendental idea of his Statism with what he thinks is the good that results from it, thereby making a subreption. However, Kant’s naivete and invalid inferences in his political thinking do not detract from the force of his formidable intellect and the fact (to those who clearly grasp his thought in the critiques) that he will always be regarded as one of the greatest of thinkers.
To avoid having to live in situations where calm seemingly prevails as under a Carthaginian peace, Kant proposes a federation of states as opposed to a world government which would be far more restrictive. And so,
One cannot conceive of international right as a right to war (since this would be a presumptive right to determine what is right, not according to universally valid external laws that restrict the freedom of every individual, but rather by means of violence, according to one-sided maxims); one would have to mean by it that it is perfectly just that people who are so disposed to annihilate each other and thereby find perpetual peace in the vast grave that covers all the horrors of violence together with their perpetrators. As concerns the relations among states, according to reason there can be no other way for them to emerge from the lawless condition, which contains only war, than for them to relinquish, just as do individual human beings, their wild (lawless) freedom, to accustom themselves to public binding laws, and to thereby form a state of peoples (civitas gentium), which, continually expanding, would ultimately comprise all of the peoples of the world. But…they do not, according to their conception of international right, want the positive idea of a world republic at all…only the negative surrogate of a lasting and continually expanding federation that prevents war [that] can curb the inclination to hostility and defiance of the law, though there is the constant threat of its breaking loose again. (PP 8:357)
Again it is Kant’s naivete that strikes us here but to be fair, he would not witness the ultra violent shenanigans of the twentieth century. Even the UN has not been successful from keeping the world free from incessant conflict and we need only witness the rogue state acts of unilateral state aggression by America to witness states which violate happily any attempt at keeping the peace anywhere.
But what is also noteworthy is Kant’s concept of the state not only as an international entity but the idea that instead of the state as an expression of Statism, we can have a ‘state of peoples’: Which can be viewed as a transnational community of people that operates according to its own principles as representative of individuals per se with a group identity of its own; and this idea in itself seems contrary to the war mongering attitude of so-called nation states as such.
Kant also insists that it is this tendency for private interests (whether in the form of individuals, groups or expressed by states) to hold sway over public good which also needs to be curtailed by laws. So laws of the State are needed to contain the extravagant behaviour of individuals and the State as such. Yet, with these concepts, Kant is setting himself up to contradict the essence of his own philosophy. Kant injures his own good philosophical name only to be saved repeatedly by the insight of his ideas from the critiques.
In any case, Kant was quite aware of the issue of politics and morality. For he says,
Morality in itself belongs to the practical sphere, in the objective sense, as the totality of the unconditionally commanding laws according to which we ought to act. It is therefore obviously inconsistent, after having acknowledged the authority of this concept of duty, to want to say that one cannot carry out one’s moral duties. For if this were so, the concept of duty would altogether disappear from the realm of morality…Therefore there can be no dispute between politics as the applied doctrine of right and morality as a theoretical doctrine of right…unless one were to regard morality as a universal doctrine of prudence, that is, to regard it as a theory of maxims according to which one selects the most effective means to attain ends to one’s own advantage, that is, to deny that morality exists at all. (PP 8:370)
Not only is Kant simplistic but he resorts to question begging. He now claims that because there must be duty with the concept of morality, that politics as a means of acting out what is right must therefore be rationalized by morality. Not only does politics always seem to be moral according to Kant’s assertion, but he thinks that anything different from his claims are a sign of a doctrine of self serving interests, expedience or prudence. So what is morality and what is politics is answered with obfuscation and unhelpful circularity. He then in the next paragraphs provides contradictory statements which only show that politics is indeed prudence in the form of self interest in that State violence is necessary to ensure order as relying on stability and good sense to come about based on people’s good intentions derived from morality is not realistic (in other words better to be prudent, safe than sorry, etc and personal morality is a fantasy).
We see as moral politicians perhaps those like Lincoln and Robert Kennedy (or good men who tend to be killed for their efforts). And then we have the other ‘moralists’ such as the Bushes, Tony Blair, and neo-conservatives in all their guises. But, it gets bizarre --
The moral politician will make the following into a basic principle: if a flaw that could not have been foreseen is found in the constitution of the state or in its relations with other nations, then it is a duty…for heads of state, to focus on remedying it as soon as possible and bringing it into compliance with natural right…even if this should require sacrifices of their egoism…A state can govern itself in a republican manner, even if it still possesses a despotic ruling power according to its present constitution… [and] Even if the impetuosity of a revolution provoked by a bad constitution were to bring about a more lawful one illegitimately it should no longer be deemed permissible to return people to the previous constitution, even though under the old constitution any person who had violently or maliciously participated in that revolution would have rightly been subject to the punishment accorded rebels. (PP 8:372)
Kant’s pipe dream comes alive when he believes that there are such ‘moral politicians’ who can remedy what is wrong and make it right for all: Sure, there are Lincolns and RFKs but they don’t last long. He is convinced that his definition of republican constitutionalism and Rightism will save the day, because people -- including rulers -- will for some hallucinogenic reason simply abide by that.
Kant is also convinced that right should be might, and vice versa, and despotism can work with republicanism (proven by nation states today), and that revolutions to make things better should not see punishment for rebels since the new state of affairs take priority over the old one; that is, the current constitution no matter what form it takes, should take precedence over everything else. So apart from his obsession on the validity of his (constitutional) republicanism by virtue of his definition of it, there is the underlying worship of force and authority in Kant’s political thinking.
In the end, might is right, right is might, that which is legal is right, so etc. -- that is the disturbing basic assumption of Kant’s politics; and he extends and merges that with mystical obedience to be given to those who hold authoritative posts and have titles.
And yet again, he begs the issue by not explaining what he means by having a revolution bring about a “a more lawful” constitution. What exactly is a “bad constitution”? The revolution is “illegitimate” even if it goes against a despotic system. But the question at the heart of the matter would be: Are there good reasons for partaking in revolution, and if so, what are they (apart from opposing despotism). In fact, why are there rebellions and revolutions at all? And why should any people abide under unendurable conditions just because there is a so-called constitution? Just having a legal framework does not mean the laws of a state, or a constitution, are thereby just and humane.
We shall see that Kant does not favour revolutions if he can help it and any form of perceived order is better than none. So we take a look at an important though not as well known late work of Kant entitled “One the old saw: That may be right in theory but it won’t work in practice” (TP).
Kant is trying here to not only defend his moral philosophy but show that it is workable in tandem with his political ideas. He begins with some instructive comments on key principles from his moral philosophy,
…the sole end of the Creator is neither the morality of man alone nor happiness alone; instead, it is the highest good possible in the world: the union and concordance of the two…[the] concept of duty need not be based upon any particular end, but that…it introduced another end for the human will: namely, to strive as best he can for the highest good that is possible in the world (universal happiness linked to and in accordance with the purest morality in the world as a whole). (TP 8:279)
Kant then follows this section with a detailed note explaining the intricacies of how the highest good of all is not in itself a goal but that which forms a basis for a process that aims towards producing what is good for everyone emanating from moral grounds. This quest for doing what is right and the constraints working with this in mind provide the limiting and framing factors that guide people toward some form of moral discipline. The ideas of duty, morality and the highest good of all are at the centre of Kant’s thinking and will be looked at closer.
But let us go back to Kant’s political ideas which he develops to their disturbing end in the rest of TP. He continues (Kant’s italics in all quotes throughout),
This is what we call the civil state; and in that state the innate right of everyone is the same…entitling him to compel all others to observe the bounds within which their use of their freedom is compatible with mine. Since a man’s birth is not an action of his and thus does not bring upon him unequal legal status, nor subject him to any coercive laws other than those which he…shares with all the rest, there can be no member of the community, no fellow subject, who is innately privileged over another. (TP 8:293)
Kant’s apparent respect for equality is something that is developed elsewhere with cogency but here is out of place as he demonstrates shortly why the rulers of men and those who play the role of legislators are above their fellow human beings; they are given mythical powers (usually because they use sheer force) of the State, and have an elevated status with pomp and circumstance due to their birth and position. Needless to say, this tends to undermine Kant’s attempt at equality for all.
Interestingly, Kant then brings in some pre-Marxian analysis,
We may disregard the question how one man can have rightly come to own more land than his own hands can put to use (for acquisition by armed conquest is not original acquisition), and how so many who otherwise would have been capable of acquiring permanent property happen to be reduced to serving that landowner for their livelihood. In any event it would conflict with the previous principle, equality, if the large landowning class were so privileged by law that either its descendants would always remain large landowners…or that in case of such division none but members of a certain, arbitrarily chosen class could acquire any part of the estates. (TP 8:296)
Kant next expands his idea of a civil constitution and why people should be bound by it;
It is rather a mere idea of reason, albeit one with indubitable practical reality, obligating every lawmaker to frame his laws so that they might have come from the united will of an entire people, and to regard any subject who would be a citizen as if he had joined in voting for such a will. For this is the touchstone of the legitimacy of all public law. If a law is so framed that all the people could not possibly give it their consent – as…a law granting the hereditary privilege of master status to a certain class of subjects—the law is unjust; but if it is at all possible that a people might agree on it, then the people’s duty is to look upon the law as just, even assuming that their present situation or the tenor of their present way of thinking were such that, if consulted, they would probably refuse to agree. (TP 8:297)
Here Kant’s concepts of the State, civil constitution and political representation come into further relief. He develops the idea of what he thinks the general will and social contract is and emanating from that, he formulates synthetic a priori ideas on how people should operate under such circumstances. As he extrapolates his ideas he provides every possible justification for the status quo.
In many so-called democracies there are numerous unjust laws, as Kant calls them, which give master status to a privileged class of subjects like big banks, corporations and members of the government (and wealthy individuals). What is Air Force One and all the security that goes with it? What good are security services of the world that look after the elite and their families while throwing away tax payers’ money? What is the legal mumbo-jumbo that allows corporations and banks to be treated as persons – how can they possibly be persons? Why are the actual persons hiding behind the front of these non-human and inhuman entities allowed to disingenuously avoid legal accountability for their harm to people, society and the environment?
To say that if it might be possible for people to ‘agree’ on something to render a law just is not quite right as Kant himself shows in his moral philosophy. There is no social-legal agreement alone that can decide what is just, for such notions like that of right/wrong and justice come from within each person working towards the highest good of all; and that will inherently be against anything that smacks of injustice. Justness of laws are not determined from a compact by people agreeing to any law imposed on them by the authorities, that is, an external source. If the compact is made after the fact of a moral consensus between people who believe something is right so as to be worthy of happiness and for the highest good of all, then it is a different matter. But that too will inevitably go against the grain of agreeing on the justness of a law that is imposed by structures from without.
And not only does Kant place lawmakers above the law, they are paradoxically allowed to provide laws, in effect, which support moral decay in a society through lax legislation and abet any entity that makes money irrespective of the harm it does. To add insult to injury, he states that even if there were grounds for remonstrating against such nonsensical and harmful laws we should still obey them.
It is important to note that Kant confuses the positivist aspect of his ideas in the form a synthetic a priori political and legal theory, with the normative aspect of what one should do (thanks to his subreption on this issue). This will be clearer in the context of his practical philosophy which reveals the inherent tension in Kant’s political ideas when held in contrast to his moral ones.
If diplomats are said to be honest men sent abroad to lie for their countries, Kant seems to allow for philosophers being a group of honest and smart folk made to rationalize what is wrong and decidedly bad for people.
Kant further expatiates his political ideas:
If a people were to judge that a certain actual legislation will with the utmost probability deprive them of their happiness – what can such people do? Should they not resist? The answer can be only: they can do nothing but obey. For the question is not what happiness the subject may expect from the establishment of a community or from its administration. Rather, the issue is first of all the legal order which is thereby to be secured for all. This is the supreme principle from which all maxims concerning a community must start, and which is not limited by any other principle. Regarding happiness no universally valid principle of legislation can be given. For both the circumstances of the time and the highly contradictory and constantly changing delusions in which each man seeks his happiness…render all fixed principles impossible and unfit by themselves to serve as principles of legislation…but the common weal to be considered first of all is precisely that legal constitution which secures the freedom of everyone by means of laws, leaving him to pursue his happiness by whichever way seems best to him as long as he does not infringe upon that universal freedom under the law and thus upon the rights of other fellow subjects. (TP 8:298)
Kant here subscribes to the view that you may possibly please all of the people some of the time, some of the people all of the time (the ruling and aristocratic class perhaps), but never all of the people all of the time. Happiness is so elusive and arbitrary that the only way to secure good for anyone or everyone is through obedience of State laws. The maxim that Statism is supreme for Kant shows that in the interests of all, everyone should bow down in unmitigated obeisance to the law; that is, no one can do what makes them happy, nor even worthy of happiness. They must obey for the sake of societal stability. So automatons are the order of the day.
However, what is important is the mythology that has been handed down to our time on constitutional and civil law, and government: That laws are for the good of all and our best interests are served by obeying them irrespective as to which class of people act as overlords over others; and if you question this and seek to rebel, then you deserve empathy but are breaking the rules of the system. Unfortunately, Kant’s obsession with rules in his philosophy does not do him good here, for instead of ascertaining reliable grounds for knowledge as the critiques deal with, he also thinks you can have certainty and thereby stability in a political system by unquestioningly obeying rules as well.
Kant takes to a new high, or low, when he delves so deeply into his politics that he is in danger of being labeled a supporter of dictators:
…but there can be no error of judgment when he [lawmaker] asks himself whether or not the law is in accord with the legal principle. For here he possesses that infallible yardstick (and a priori at that) – the idea of the original contract. (He need not wait for experience, as he must in following the principle of happiness, to instruct him first about the suitability of his means). Just as long as it is not self-contradictory to assume that all the people consent to such a law, however distasteful they may find it, the law is in accord with justice. But if public law is in accord with justice, if it is unimpeachable, irreprehensible from the point of view of the right, it carries with it the authority to coerce and, conversely, a ban on any active resistance to the lawmaker’s will. In other words, the power in the state that lends effect to the law is irresistible, and there is no legally existing community that does not have such power to crush all inner resistance, since this resistance would be following a maxim whose general application would destroy all civil constitutions in which alone men can have rights. (TP 8:299)
Here Kant has produced a circular process of self justification of the legal = right = might = legal = right etc. such that there is nothing that can be done wrong when done in the name of the State or law. However, he takes things to a another level when he adds infallibility as a yardstick in that any a priori concept such as apparently that of an original contract. This is where Kant finally fetishizes his a priori notion and transcendental ideas. He has produced a transcendentalism which teeters and falls into transcendence.
However, it does seem self-contradictory to claim that all the people would consent to laws that are particularly distasteful precisely because they would be deemed unjust for many anyway; and a la Kant, we could say that a priori all people do not bow down to injustice as it is their nature to gravitate toward justice and so some will go against such injustice. And to boot, at an empirical level, evidence can be found to support such a priori thinking: That’s why, for instance, people rebel and foment revolutions – no mystery here.
But Kant is in need of an excuse to justify a vicious circular argument that sanctions the crushing of all rebellions or any attempt at revolution simply because he thinks Statism is the biggest blessing for human beings.
Kant then goes on to openly support tyranny;
It follows that any resistance to the supreme lawmaking power, any incitement of dissatisfied subjects to action, any uprising that bursts into rebellion—that all this is the worst, most punishable crime in a community. For it shatters the community’s foundations. And this ban is absolute, so unconditional that even though that supreme power or its agent, the head of state, may have broken the original contract, even though in the subject’s eyes he may have forfeited the right to legislate by empowering the government to rule tyrannically by sheer violence, even then the subject is allowed no resistance, no violent counteraction. The reason is that once a civil constitution exists, a people no longer have the right to judge how the constitution ought to be administered. For suppose they had such a right and their judgment ran counter to that of the actual head of state: who is to decide which side is right? Neither one can act as a judge in his own case. To decide between the head and the people there would have to be a head above the head—which is self-contradictory…The one who is in control of the supreme administration of public justice…is precisely the head of state…And no one in the community can thus have a right to contest that control of his. (TP 8:299-300)
Once again, Kant produces the vicious circularity expressed in another variation of law + right + might = Statism (and vice versa); it is something that cannot be questioned. Because it cannot be questioned and is always right, the head must be above everyone else and no matter what -- even if the regime is the worst you can imagine -- we should surrender reasonableness to logic so as to avoid contradiction more than anything else. The logic Kant uses here is a transcendental logic within this framework of his synthetic a priori political ideas of justifying dictatorship. Disturbingly, it seems for Kant that human worth can never surpass the need to be crushed righteously and legally by authority since what would life be about without the State? Kant produces a genuine reductio ad absurdum with his political ideas.
Kant continues about the social contract and why it should be obeyed like an ‘iron law’;
If one had asked…what is right—and the principles of this are a priori certain and cannot be bungled by any empiricist—the idea of the social contract would retain its unimpeachable prestige…solely as the rational principle for judging any public lawful constitution as such. And one would see that until a general will exists, the people possess no right at all to coerce their ruler, since it is only through him that they can legally coerce. Yet, once that general will exists, there can be no popular coercion of the ruler, because then the people themselves would be the supreme ruler. Consequently, the people never have any right of coercion…against the head of state. (TP 8:302)
So here even when the deformed idea of a social contract is brought in as the supposed idea representing the general will of the people, the calculus of Statism reigns supreme; no matter what the mediating concept is, ‘social contract’ or ‘general will’, you cannot be above the supreme ruler for you are but a nonentity meant to be fodder for ideas like ‘general will’ -- but in actuality merely justifying the master-slave paradigm.
In the interests of being complete, Kant furnishes more ideas on the State,
The rule is, rather, always to prefer that passive state to the perilous position of seeking a better one, a position to which Hippocrates’ advice to physicians applies…decision is difficult, experiment perilous. All constitutions of sufficiently long standing, whatever their flaws and for all their differences, yield the same result: one is content with the constitution one lives under. (TP 8:306)
This is quite strange coming from the man who enacted a so-called Copernican revolution in philosophy and challenged the status quo of dogmatism and empiricism, only to give the most reactionary advice that makes no evolution for humanity possible. How life itself could progress in such self-defeating devolutionary Statism beggars belief.
The price of all necessities keep rising…And no peace lasts long enough for peacetime savings to match the cost of the next war, a complaint for which the invention of national debts is an ingenious but ultimately self-destructive nostrum. As a result, impotence must finally accomplish what good will ought to have done but did not: the organization of every state’s internal affairs so that the decisive voice on whether or not to wage war is not that of the head of state—whom the war costs actually nothing—but that of the people, who pay for it…For the people are hardly likely to plunge themselves into penury—which never touches the head of state—out of sheer lust of expansion or because of supposed purely verbal insults. And so their descendants will not be burdened with debts they have not brought on themselves; they too—due not to any love for them, but only to the self-love of each era—will be able to progress toward an ever better condition, even in a moral sense… (TP 8:311).
Not only do we see the relevance of war and indebtedness right till today where generations have to pay for what others created due to greed and craving for conquest, but the disease of debt is passed onto each succeeding generation. Kant again starts to make the normative shift from his politics to his practical philosophy and talks morality.
Kant now admits that if the people act from moral grounds and good will then they would take the war mongering rulers to task because, and this is crucial: It is practical reason and the moral drive that leads to a form of empowerment. And it is this that is the centerpiece of what comes next.
